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Eleventh Amendment: A Move Towards
Simplicity in the Test for Immunity
Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation'
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State.2
I. INTRODUCTION
In Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., the Supreme Court
examined a recurring issue concerning which entities may claim immunity
under the Eleventh Amendment The Eleventh Amendment was ratified in
response to Chisholm v. Georgia,4 which held that the language of Article III,
§ 2 makes a state amenable to suit in federal court by citizens of another
state.' By its express terms, Eleventh Amendment immunity is only available
to states being sued by citizens of other states.' Since its enactment some two
centuries ago, the Amendment has been interpreted to extend to a state being
sued by its own citizens7 and to agencies which constitute an arm-of-the-
state.8
1. Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 115 S. Ct. 394 (1994).
2. U.S. CONST., amend. XI [ratified February 7, 1795].
3. Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 397.
4. Chisholmv. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (holding that Article 111, §2
of the U.S. Constitutiongranted federal court's jurisdictionto hear controversies where
an individual citizen of one state sued another state). In Chisholm, a citizen of South
Carolina was allowed to sue the State of Georgia on a revolutionary war debt. Id.
5. Scholars generally agree that the Eleventh Amendment was adoptedto overturn
the Supreme Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia. See, e.g., William A. Fletcher,
A HistoricalExplanation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an
Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35
STAN. L. REv. 1033, 1054 (1983); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and
State SovereignImmunity: AReinterpretation,83 COLUM. L. REv. 1889, 1920 (1983);
Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1430 (1987).
6. See the text of the Eleventh Amendment quoted at the beginning of this note.
7. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
8. Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 463 (1945) (holding
that if the judgment would be paid out of state funds, the state is the real party in
interest regardless of whether it is the named defendant, and therefore, the suit is
barred by immunity). Hagoodv. Southern, 117 U.S. 52, 67 (1886) (holding that the
1
Winking: Winking: Eleventh Amendment
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
MISSOURILA W REVIEW
Governmental growth has given rise to new entities which contain
qualities of both state actors and private business.9 As these entities multiply
and change, the immunity question returns to the forefront." The Hess
Court is not the first to address whether immunity is available to a bi-state
entity." The issue returned because of a conflict between the Second and
Third Circuits regarding the test for immunity." This note examines the
Supreme Court's restatement of the test for immunity and its impact in future
Eleventh Amendment cases.
II. FACTS AND HOLDiNG
Albert Hess and Charles F. Walsh were railroad workers employed by the
Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation ("PATH").13 PATH is a wholly
owned subsidiary of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey which
operates a commuter railroad connecting New York City to northern New
Jersey. 4 Both Walsh and Hess suffered job-related injuries in 1986 and
Eleventh Amendment prohibits suits against tate officers and agents because they are
representatives of the state). But cf Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530
(1890) (holding that the Amendment was interpreted to exclude municipalities and
political subdivisions because even though they were territorially within the state,
politically theywere corporations created by the state). See also infranotes 47-48 and
53 discussing the arm-of-the-state doctrine in its present form.
9. The growth of state government can be measured by the increase in state
budgets, the increase in number of employees, and the development of specialized
entities.
10. Alex E. Rogers, Note, Clothing State Governmental Entities with Sovereign
Immunity: Disarrayin the EleventhAmendmentAnn-of-the-State Doctrine, 92 COLUM.
L. REv. 1243, 1244 (1992). See also infra notes 133-141 for greater discussion of
Rogers' article and its impact on the decision in Hess.
11. Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commission, 359 U.S. 275, 282 (1959)
(holding that there is a presumption of immunity available to bi-state entities as the
creation of two states); Lake Country Estatesv. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440
U.S. 391, 402 (1979) (holding that the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, as a bi-state
entity, was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity under the am-of-the-state
test).
12. CompareFeeneyv. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 87 3 F.2d 628,630-32
(2d Cir. 1989), aff'd on other grounds, 495 U.S. 299 (1990) (holding that Eleventh
Amendment immunity does not extend to PATH, and even if it did, PATH had waived
the immunity) with Port Authority Police Benevolent Ass'n, Inc. v. Port Authority of
New York and New Jersey, 819 F.2d 413, 414 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 953
(1987) [hereinafter Port Authority PBA] (holding that the Port Authority, as an arm
of the compacting states, was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.).
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1987, respectively, in unrelated accidents." They each brought suit against
PATH under the Federal Employers' Liability Act 6 (hereinafter "FELA"). 17
Both filed their complaints within FELA's three-year time limit, but neither
filed within the one-year statutory time limiti8 allowing individuals to sue the
PATH.'9
PATH asserted its Eleventh Amendment immunity and moved to dismiss
the suits filed by Hess and Walsh based upon their failure to proceed against
it during the one year period provided by statute."0 The district court
dismissed their claims on the grounds that PATH is cloaked with Eleventh
Amendment" immunity and Hess and Walsh failed to make claims within
the statutory period.' The district court followed the precedent in the Third
Circuit? recognizing PATH as an arm-of-the-state.24 The issue on appeal
was not the workers' entitlement to benefits due to their injuries, but rather
their ability to sue PATH in the federal forum.' On appeal, the Third
Circuit consolidated Hess and Walsh and summarily affirmed the judgments. 6
15. Id. Hess was working in the engine of a commuter train when, due to the
negligence of the Port Authority, the window struck his right hand. He claimed a soft
tissue injury and superiostela hematoma of the hand. Hess v. Port Authority Trans-
Hudson, 809 F. Supp. 1172, 1174 (D.N.J. 1992). Walsh was injured when the
passenger train door slammed into his right wrist and arm. Walsh v. Port Authority
Trans-Hudson, 813 F. Supp. 1095, 1096 (D.N.J. 1993).
16. 35 Stat. 65 (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §51 (1986)).
17. For the district court decisions, see Walsh v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson
Corp., 813 F. Supp. 1095 (D.N.J. 1993), and Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson
Corp., 809 F. Supp. 1172 (D.N.J. 1992). Because the issue on appeal was the same,
the Appellate Court consolidated the cases and rendered its opinion affinning the
district courts' decisions. Hessv. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 8 F.3d 811 (3d
Cir. 1993).
18. The agreement between New York and New Jersey is set forth in the state
statutes at: N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 32:1-3-32:1-24 (West 1990 & Supp. 1995) and N.Y.
UNCONSOL. LAW §§ 6401-6423 (McKinney 1979 & Supp. 1995).
19. Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 397.
20. Id. Similar statutes inNew York andNew Jerseywaive Eleventh Amendment
immunity for an injured employee during the first year following the accident. Id. at
398. See supra note 18 for citation to the state statutes.
21. See text accompanying supra note 2, setting forth the text of the Eleventh
Amendment.
22. Walsh, 813 F. Supp. at 1096-1097 and Hess, 809 F. Supp. 1178-1182.
23. Port Authority PBA, 819 F.2d at 418 (granting PATH immunity from suit in
federal court).
24. Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 397.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 398.
1995]
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In order to resolve an intercircuit conflict," the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.' After applying the previous "arm-of-the-state" doctrine, Justice
Ginsburg in her majority opinion reformulated the analysis by making the
state's fiscal responsibility for the entity's debts the controlling factor." The
majority said that lower courts should begin with the presumption of non-
immunity for bi-state entities."0 Applying these changes in its analysis
allowed the majority to conclude that PATH was not cloaked with Eleventh
Amendment immunity."'
IT. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Eleventh Amendment was adopted in the wake of the decision in
Chisholm v. Georgia.2 The immunity granted by the Amendment to the
states is not absolute. There are at least three limitations on the immunity
from suit. First, the state can waive the immunity, thereby subjecting itself
to suit.33 Second, Congress can abrogate the immunity.34 And, finally,
even if the state is protected by the Eleventh Amendment, the exemption only
27. The intercircuit conflict was caused when the Third Circuit granted the Port
Authority immunity in Hess, after the Second Circuit's decision denying the Port
Authority immunity on basically the same facts. Hess, 8 F.3d at 811; Feeney, 873
F.2d at 631. The Supreme Court bypassed judgment on whether the Port Authority
enjoyedEleventhAmendment immunitywhen it affirmed the Second Circuit's decision
in Feeney. Feeney, 495 U.S. at 308-09.
28. Hessv. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 114 S. Ct. 1292 (1994) (granting
certiorari); Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 397.
29. Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 404.
30. Id. at 402.
31. Id. at 406.
32. See supranotes 4 and 5. For the history of the proposals in Congress and the
eventual adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, see William A. Fletcher, The Diversity
Explanation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Reply to the Critics, 56 U. CI. L. REV.
1261, 1270-71 (1989).
33. The court will strictly scrutinize the language of the statute before it will find
that the State has waived its immunity or that Congress has abrogated it. Atascardero
State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 239-40 (1985) (holding that state waives it
immunity only by language stating that it consents to suit infederal court. Consenting
to suit in its state court does not waive Eleventh Amendment immunity) (emphasis
added).
34. Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230 (1989) (In order for Congress to
abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity, its intent must be made unmistakably clear).
[Vol. 60
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extends to suit in a federal forum.35 The Eleventh Amendment does not bar
citizens from bringing the action in a state court.3 6
The current parameters of Eleventh Amendment immunity were defined
by judicial interpretation following its adoption. 7 The propriety of the broad
historical interpretation has been under attack in recent years by judges and
scholars alike.3 ' These interpretational issues have largely arisen from the
Supreme Court's attempt to deal with entities that were not defined in 1795.
Because the Amendment has been interpreted to confer immunity only
upon states, it has been proposed that the framers did not consider whether
new governmental entities should share in that grant.39 Bi-state compact
entities are one of those relatively new forms of governance which have
35. The Eleventh Amendment literally restricts only the "[j]udicial power of the
United States" from extending to suit by a citizen against another state. See text
accompanying supra note 2.
36. See text accompanying supra note 2.
37. See supra notes 7 and 8 for a discussion of the cases which expanded the
meaning of the Amendment beyond its text and basically defined its coverage.
38. Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102
HARv. L. REv. 1342 (1989). In 1989, the Court was relatively split over the reading
of the Eleventh Amendment. Critics of the Eleventh Amendment can be divided into
three groups: First, the diversity theorists, who argue that the amendment would bar
jurisdiction only when the sole basis of federal jurisdiction is diversity of citizenship;
second, the congressional abrogation theorists, who argue that the states are immune
from suit except when abrogated by Congress; and third, the pure textualists, who
support an interpretation based solely on the plain meaning. Id. at 1342-44. Lawrence
Marshall includes Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens and Blackmun in the diversity
theorist category, and Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices O'Connor and White in the
congressional abrogation category. At the time of his article in 1989, Lawrence
Marshall was uncertain of Justices Scalia and Kennedy's position. Id. at 1371 n.7.
See also, the following articles setting forth disagreement among scholars
regarding the proper interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment. William A. Fletcher,
AHistoricalInterpretationofthe EleventhAmendment,35 STAN. L. REV. 1033 (1983);
Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U.
Cfu. L. REV. 61 (1989); William P. Marshall, The Diversity Theory of the Eleventh
Amendment, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1372 (1989); Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the
Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1342 (1989); William A.
Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh Amendment, 56 U. CmI. L. REV.
1261 (1989); William A. Fletcher, Exchange on the Eleventh Amendment, 57 U. CI.
L. REv. 131 (1990).
39. JonathanW.Needle, Note, Anrm of the State 'Analysis in EleventhAmendment
Jurisprudence, 6 REv. LrIG. 193, 194 (1987) (citing Martha A. Field, The Eleventh
Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REv.
515 (1978) and John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign
Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLuM. L. REv. 1889 (1983)).
1995]
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developed mainly during the twentieth century. The development of regional
compact entities were necessary to fill the gap existing in the effective
management of railroads, waterways, and highways.40 Deciding whether
these entities should be immune from suit in a federal forum has been an issue
that the Supreme Court faced on a number of occasions during this century. 1
The Supreme Court initially answered the question of the availability of
Eleventh Amendment immunity to bi-state entities in 1959. But since
1979, Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency43 has set the
tone for conferring immunity to bi-state entities. In 1969, the Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency [hereinafter TRPA] was created pursuant to compact
between California and Nevada to coordinate and regulate development of the
Lake Tahoe Basin and to conserve its natural resources.4 Property owners
around Lake Tahoe alleged that the TRPA, in adopting a land use ordinance,
improperly took their property because the ordinance destroyed its value.4"
The court of appeals held that because TRPA's authority came from the states,
it was an agent of the state protected by the Eleventh Amendment.46 In
40. Frank P. Grad, Federal-State Compact: A New Experiment in Cooperative
Federalism,63 COLUM. L. REv. 825, 851-52 (1963) (citing Felix Frankfurter & James
M. Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A Study in InterstateAdjustments,
34 YALE L.J. 685, 729 (1925), and agreeing with their conclusion that the interstate
compact agency is the most flexible device for dealing with multi-state problems on
a regional scale.)
41. See Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commission, 359 U.S. 275 (1959);
Lake Country Estate v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979); Port
Authority Trans-Hudson v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299 (1990).
42. Petty, 359 U.S. at 279 (holding that immunity was conferred on bi-state
entities because they are agents of two states, but concluding that such immunity was
not available in Petty because the states had waived it).
43. Lake Country Estates, 440 U.S. 391 (1979).
44. Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, Pub. L. No. 91-148, 83 Stat. 360 (1969)
(codified as amended at CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 66800-66801 (West 1983 & Supp.
1995) and NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 277.190-277.220 (1991 & Supp. 1994)).
45. Lake Country Estates,440 U.S. at 394. Petitioners alleged alternative theories
for a federal claim: A constitutional claimunder the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
due process clauses with diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and a
cause of action authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 with jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1343. Id. at 395.
The suit also named the members of TRPA's governing body and its executive
officer as defendants along with TRPA. The district court held the individuals immune
from liability. The court of appeals stated that the individual activity receives absolute
immunity if it was legislative, but only qualified immunity if executive action. The
court of appeals remanded to determine the character of the conduct. The Supreme
Court affirmed this conclusion. Id. at 396, 402.
46. Id. at 396.
[Vol. 60
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reversing the court of appeals, the Supreme Court formulated a test for
determining when a bi-state agency is entitled to immunity. The test,
generally referred to as the arm-of-the-state doctrine," provides that if the
compact created "an agency comparable to a county or municipality, which
has no Eleventh Amendment immunity, the Amendment should not be
construed to immunize such entity.""
In deciding whether TRPA was similar to a municipality or other political
subdivision, the Court found the following factors important: both states
disclaimed any intent to confer immunity on TRPA; the compact considered
the TRPA a political subdivision; that its obligations were not binding on the
states; that sixty percent of the governing members were chosen by local
governments rather than state; that the county funded the TRPA; that the states
had no veto ability49; and land regulation was traditionally done on a local
level.5 Although there were dissents regarding other issues in this case, no
member of the Supreme Court dissented regarding the denial of immunity to
the TRPA.5
In the same year that Lake Country Estates was decided, the Third Circuit
also handed down a decision setting out three additional factors for evaluating
an Eleventh Amendment immunity claim: (1) is the entity performing a
governmental or a proprietary function? (2) does the entity have the power to
sue and be sued? and (3) is the property of the entity immune from state
taxation?
52
With the arm-of-the-state doctrine' in place, the question of its
effectiveness in the lower courts was yet to be decided. The Third Circuit was
the first to apply it. In Port Authority Police Benevolent Association, Inc. v.
47. Id. at 401-02. See infra note 53.
48. Lake Country Estates, 440 U.S. at 401.
49. In fact, California had to resort to litigation to compel cooperation of the
agency. California v. TRPA, 516 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1975).
50. Lake Country Estates, 440 U.S. at 401-02. One author has summarized the
factors for deciding whether an entity resembles a political subdivision or a state as
follows: (1) language of the agreement; (2) state's fiscal responsibility; (3) funding;
(4) who does the appointing; (5) characterization of the agency's function as
traditionally state or municipal; and (6) state ability to veto. Rogers, supra note 10,
at 1263-64.
51. Lake Country Estates, 440 U.S. at 406-09.
52. Blake v. Kline, 612 F.2d 718, 722 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921
(1980).
53. The arm-of-the-state doctrine, as delineated in Lake Country Estates, was a
factor based test for determining whether an entity could be considered part of the state
and thus qualify for sovereign immunity granted by the Eleventh Amendment. It
measures whether an entity is functioning like a state agency or if it is more like a
political subdivision, which has not been entitled to immunity.
1995]
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Port Authority of New York and New Jersey,54 the Police Benevolent
Association [hereinafter "PBA"] brought a § 1983 action seeking to enjoin the
Port from using an expired promotion list for promotional purposes.55 The
district court found that PBA had been deprived of property without due
process.56 However, before the court entered the order, the promoted
individuals moved to intervene and dismiss on grounds of Eleventh
Amendment immunity.57 The district court granted both motions and PBA
appealed.58
On the question of immunity, the Third Circuit interpreted Lake Country
Estates as making the immunity dependent upon whether the Port Authority
was more like an arm of the state or like a municipality.59 In making that
judgment the Third Circuit applied the factors delineated by the Supreme
Court.6" Application of the factors led the Third Circuit to conclude that the
Port Authority functions as an agency of the state.61 But before granting
immunity, the Third Circuit still believed it was necessary to comply with the
conditions it previously announced in Blake.62 Summarily dispensing with
these factors, the court concluded that the Port Authority was entitled to
Eleventh Amendment Immunity.63 Interestingly, the Third Circuit never
mentioned the divided sovereign--the fact that the Port Authority was the
54. 819 F.2d 413 (1987).
55. Id. at 413-14.





61. A summary of the courts findings are: (1) While the compact did not refer
to it as a state agency, the courts had always done so and the legislature did not
attempt to alter such definition; (2) the Authority was initially funded by the state; (3)
if the Authority's funds were depleted (while the court admits that is highly unlikely),
the state legislatures would appropriate funds necessary to meet its expenditures; (4)
the governing body was chosen entirely by the states; (5) facilitating commerce was
traditionally a function of government; and (6) the state governors had veto power.
Id. at 415-17.
62. The Court held the Authority's functions were governmental; that it was
exempt from state property taxes; and that while it statutorily consented to suit, it
excepted injunctive relief from the consent, and alone, consent to suit was not
sufficient to abrogate immunity. Id. at 418 (citing Florida Dept. of Health and
Rehabilitative Services v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 150 (1981)).
The Third Circuit cited a Supreme Court decision for the proposition that a statute
allowing an institution to sue and be sued cannot alone take away Eleventh
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creation of two states-as an issue. Nor did the court consider the effect of
having Congress involved in the original compact creating the organization.
The entire decision was dependent on the answers to the variables set forth in
both Lake Country Estates and Blake.
Within a few years, the Second Circuit handed down a decision contrary
to the Third Circuit opinion in Port Authority PBA, holding that PATH" was
not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity." Applying the arm-of-the-
state doctrine of Lake Country Estates, the Second Circuit decided that there
was not enough evidence or "good reason" for finding PATH to be a state
agency.66 The court decided that PATH's liability would not place the
states' treasuries at risk; therefore, it could not receive immunity.'
In recognizing that its decision created a conflict with the Third Circuit,
the Second Circuit noted that the divergence was due to their different
interpretation of the states' exposure to liability.6" As further support for not
adopting the Third Circuit's interpretation, the Second Circuit held that, even
if PATH had Eleventh Amendment immunity, it waived the same by
consenting to suit in any court located in the New York district.69
Although the Supreme Court affirmed the Feeney decision, it did so only
on the waiver issue."0 The opinion, written by Justice O'Connor, assumed
for purposes of the waiver issue that PATH was a state agency entitled to the
states' sovereign immunity.7 The Supreme Court concluded that since
PATH's statutory consent to suit included suit in a federal court, it waived
64. PATH (the defendant inFeeney) and the Port Authority (the defendant inPort
Authority PBA) are the same for Eleventh Amendment purposes because PATH is a
wholly owned subsidiary of the Port Authority. The facts in Feeney are substantially
similar to Hess in that the action was brought by an employee of PATH for recovery
under FELA.
65. Feeney v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson, 873 F.2d 628 (2d Cir. 1989), aff'd,
495 U.S. 299 (1990).
66. Id. at 631.
67. Id. The court stated that this was not an exclusively determinative, but was
the single most important factor. Id.
68. Id. at 631-32. The Second Circuit stated that the Third Circuit's
understanding was erroneous because the state was not requiredto make appropriations
if a judgment depleted PATH's funds. Id. (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 632.
70. Feeney, 495 U.S. at 308-09. Notably, Justice O'Connor authored the opinion
in Feeney, which affirmed the denial of immunity to PATH, even though she also
authored the dissent in Hess, objecting to the complete denial of immunity to PATH.
71. Id. at 299 and 304-05 (relying uponthe conclusion of Petty, 359 U.S. at 279,
which held that the suit against a bi-state entity must be considered one against the
State since the entity is an agency of the two states which create it).
1995]
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immunity.72 Because the Supreme Court by-passed the issue of PATH's
immunity specifically, and the test for bi-state entity immunity generally, those
questions remained unresolved. 3
On the heels of the Feeney decision, a note was published which
criticized the Supreme Court's manner of handling the question of Eleventh
Amendment immunity.' Rogers took a critical approach in examining the
arm-of-the-state doctrine employed by the Supreme Court75 in Eleventh
Amendment cases, and reasoned that because the Supreme Court has failed to
give adequate direction, the lower courts adopted their own derivations
causing non-uniform results in Eleventh Amendment immunity cases.7'
Rogers proposed that the Supreme Court should adopt a test similar to the one
used in resolving antitrust state action immunity.7' Rogers submitted the
following two-pronged test: the courts should, after reviewing the state
enabling act which created the entity, (1) award immunity only when the state
expressly designates the entity as a state agency, and (2) if the statute is
unclear, immunity should be denied unless the entity was not empowered to
generate its own revenue.7"
With the challenges leveled by Rogers' note and the conditions ripe for
resolution of the disagreement between the Second and Third Circuits, it was
only a matter of time for the right case to make its way to the Supreme Court.
IV. INSTANT DEcIsIoN
A. Majority Opinion
After a brief recitation of the facts and the lower-court decisions, the
majority reviewed the development of the Port Authority to set the stage for
72. Id. at 308-309. Even though the denial of immunity was unanimous, four
Justices refused to join in Part II of the majority opinion because it dealt with
abrogation and waiver as exceptions to immunity. The concurrence asserted that the
issue should be whether the Eleventh Amendmentwould take away federal jurisdiction,
because the amendment is merely a jurisdictional provision. Id. at 310 (Brennan, J.,
concurring). JusticeBrennan, arguing for the concurrence, statedthat immunity should
not be granted because the Eleventh Amendment does not cover federal question
jurisdiction and therefore could not bar the suit. Id.
73. Id. at 308-09.
74. See Rogers, supra note 10.
75. See supra note 53.
76. Rogers, supra note 10, at 1246.
77. Rogers, supra note 10, at 1297-1300.
78. Rogers, supra note 10, at 1301, 1305.
[Vol. 60
10
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 4 [1995], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss4/6
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
deciding whether Eleventh Amendment immunity should be granted. 9 The
majority first noted the Port Authority was a bi-state entity created pursuant
to the Constitution's Interstate Compact Clause.8" Before analyzing whether
the Port Authority should be immune from suit in a federal forum, the
majority discussed the general attributes of all bi-state entities which must be
considered when deciding Eleventh Amendment immunity cases.8 The bi-
state entity does not perform the functions of a state because it addresses
problems not otherwise served by the state and it operates without concern for
state boundaries.' A further distinction between bi-state entities and a state
is that creation of a bi-state entity depends upon the agreement of several
states supported by federal approval.' As the majority summarized, because
a bi-state entity is not subject to unilateral control by a state, it should not be
reviewed in the same manner as state agencies."
The majority then applied the formula previously stated by the Supreme
Court in Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency for
deciding when a bi-state entity is entitled to immunity.86 The majority
affirmed the presumption created in Lake Country Estates that bi-state entities
do not receive immunity unless there is good reason to believe that the states
structured the new agency to share in their immunity and Congress
concurred.' Once again, the majority rejected any argument for an
expansive reading of the Amendment.8 In following Lake Country Estates,
the majority listed the relevant factors to determine whether the states intended
79. Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 398.
80. Id. at 398. The Interstate Compact Clause reads as follows:
No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep
Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact
with another State, or with a foreign power, or engage in War, unless actually
invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 3.
81. Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 400-01.
82. Id. at 400.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 401-02.
85. 440 U.S. 391 (1979).
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to cloak the entity with immunity."9 The factors were more difficult to apply
in Hess because the answers point in different directions."
PATH argued that the degree of state control should provide enough
impetus for the Court to find it to be a state agency for Eleventh Amendment
purposes.91  The majority recognized those factors relevant to the state
control question,' and acknowledged their importance, but held that control
factors cannot be decisive when dealing with a bi-state entity.' The majority
considered state control in light of the inherent division of control, and the
inability of the court to gauge actual control.94
After weighing the fiscal considerations in Hess,95 the majority found
that since a judgment against PATH would not be enforceable against either
state, the state treasuries were not in jeopardy.96 Therefore, the states lacked
fiscal responsibility for the entity, which indicated the entity should be denied
immunity. PATH argued that, since a judgment would reduce the
89. Id. The Supreme Court in deciding Lake Country Estates took six
characteristics into consideration in deciding whether the entity was entitled to
immunity. Those factors are: (1) whether it constituted a political entity; (2) division
of control between the local and state governmental entities; (3) the source of the
entity's funding; (4) the compact's statement that the state is not liable for the entity's
debt; (5) the goals of the entity; and (6) the failure to have a state veto. Lake Country
Estates, 440 U.S. at 401-02.
90. Lake Country Estates, 440 U.S. at 401-02. In this way, Hess differs from
Lake Country Estates because the factors in Lake Country Estates all pointed to
denying the entity immunity.
91. Id. at 404.
92. Factors of state control consist of the selection of the commissioners who
govern the authority, the veto power over commissioners action given to the governor
of each state, and the legislatures combined ability to increase power of the
commissioners and utilize surplus revenue. Id. at 399.
93. Id. at 404.
94. Id. The majority cited Rogers' note for his criticism of the "arm-of-the-state"
doctrine used to decide when an entity is cloaked with Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Id.
95. A review of the states' fiscal responsibility for the Authority indicated that
while the states were responsible for some of the support of PATH, they were not
liable for its debts. In the interstate compact, the states agreed to appropriate sums to
cover PATH's administrative expenses, but the contribution of funds was to end once
PATH's revenues were adequate to meet those expenditures. The majority noted that
the Port Authority has a large general fund and extensive assets, and as a result, the
states are exempt from funding it. More importantly, the interstate compact bars
PATH from receiving tax revenues, from binding the state with creditors or imposing
any charges to the states. Id. at 399 and 403.
96. Id. at 404.
97. Id. at 406.
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Authority's surplus, and the state would have to fund otherwise self-funded
projects, the impact on the states would be the same as if the judgment were
directly against the state.9" The majority rejected this argument and stated
that the proper focus in considering fiscal responsibility should be on losses
and debts rather than the use of profits or surplus.99 Although the states had
admitted that they would readily support the Authority if a judgment were to
wipe out its funds, the majority labeled this, at best, indirect
responsibility.'
The other factors in the balancing test did not advance the majority's
conclusion because they were not sufficiently indicative of the Port
Authority's character. The majority compared the Port Authority to a
municipality, 1 ' and found the comparison inconclusive.0 2 Although state
courts generally refer to PATH as a state agency, the compact and other
legislation refer to it as "common agency", or "body politic" or
"instrumentality."'0 3  Furthermore, PATH's functions are not analogous to
either traditionally state or local functions.
After considering all of the factors and finding that they point in different
directions, the majority relied on a default analysis of the twin rationales for
the Eleventh Amendment-state solvency and dignity.' In Hess, the
majority held that PATH was not entitled to EleventlL Amendment immunity
because requiring PATH to answer in federal court neither poses a threat to
the states' dignity nor places the states' treasuries at risk.0 5 These purposes
would not be served if Eleventh Amendment immunity is granted in this case,
therefore the majority denied immunity."'
The majority went on to amend the test by holding that financial
responsibility should, in future cases, be the dispositive factor in deciding
98. Id. at 405.
99. Id. at 406 (stating that since a federal judgment against the Port Authority
would not be enforceable against the state, the state is not being injured by allowing
the plaintiff to proceed in a federal forum against the entity).
100. Id. at 403.
101. Traditionally municipalities have not received Eleventh Amendment
immunity even though they are subdivisions of the state. Lincoln County v. Luning,
133 U.S. 529 (1890).
102. The majority would have denied immunity if the entitywas more similar to
a municipality than a state agency because case law has said that political subdivisions
are not afforded protection under the Eleventh Amendment. Since the comparisonwas
inconclusive, a different basis was necessary to support the denial or granting of
immunity. Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 403.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 404.
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whether to grant immunity. 7 The majority based this finding on the fact
that one of the concerns of the Eleventh Amendment was the concern for state
solvency.' As additional support for this view, the majority cited
numerous cases which relied upon protecting state solvency as the major factor
in applying the immunity doctrine. 9
B. Concurring Opinion
While in agreement with Justice Ginsburg's opinion, Justice Stevens
believed it necessary to express his position.110 His position is motivated by
a desire to reverse what he believes to be a longstanding misinterpretation of
the Eleventh Amendment."' He cited Hans v. Louisiana"' as the
beginning of the Court's broad interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment,
which led the Court to place "a lesser value on administering justice to the
individual than on giving government a license to act arbitrarily.""' Stevens
maintains that the Court has created two Eleventh Amendments, one that is
textual and another that is a policy of prudence."' The latter, according to
Stevens, is not a matter of constitutional law."5 In order to remedy this
wrong, Stevens suggests that instead of reading more into the Eleventh
Amendment than is there, the Court should grant justice to the individual. In
this case, justice was done by denying immunity to PATH."6
C. Dissenting Opinion
Four Justices dissented. Written by Justice O'Connor, the dissenting
opinion took issue with both the test and result espoused by the majority." 7
The dissent criticized the majority for placing too much emphasis on
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. In fact, the majority noted that the Second and Third Circuit were in
agreement as to the overarching importance of the state treasury factor, but the Circuits
approached this factor in different manners, therefore reaching different results. Id.
at 405.
110. Id. at 407.
111. Id.
112. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).




117. Id. at 408-412 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 60
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congressional consent to interstate compacts."' Congressional consent does
not change the nature of state power nor make the federal government a
participant, and therefore, it should not enter into consideration of Eleventh
Amendment immunity." 9 The dissent preferred a presumption of immunity
unless Congress has expressly abrogated the same. 2' By adopting the
opposite presumption, the dissent argued that Congress may now effectively
dictate Eleventh Amendment immunity in the context of interstate entities.'2 '
Although the arm-of-the-state analysis was not flawless, the presumption
should be for immunity because two states acting together are likely to be as
deserving of immunity as a state acting individually.
22
The dissent attacked the majority's creation of one overarching
principle-vulnerability of the state treasury-in deciding immunity
questions."u In making it a necessary condition, the majority reduces the
scope of immunity to the point of underprotecting state sovereignty. 2 1
Furthermore, the text of the Amendment contradicts that conclusion since it
grants immunity to suits in law or equity."
Arguing for the application of Eleventh Amendment immunity in this
case, the dissent asserted that the issue of state control was the most important
factor because it indicates whether an entity is an arm-of-the-state. 26 The
dissent thought this a better formula because it is more flexible while also
taking into account the majority's concern for the state treasury. 2 1
V. COMMENT
The consequence of Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson is three-fold.
First, in denying the Port Authority immunity, Hess finally resolves the
immunity question that had been lingering since 1990 when the Second
Circuit's denial of immunity confronted the Third Circuit's previous grant of
118. Id. at 408.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 409.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 410.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 411. An example of clear and substantial control would be State
appointments of the entity's governing personnel coupled with veto power over the
entity's acts. Id. Since both these factors are present in the Hess case, the dissent
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immunity to the Port Authority." 8 The conflict heightened in 1992 when
the Third Circuit followed its earlier analysis and again granted immunity.'29
In granting certiorari in Hess, the Supreme Court addressed the immunity
issue, 30 and upon a review of PATH's attributes, the majority reversed the
Third Circuit's grant of immunity and basically adopted the Second Circuit's
analysis.13
1
Second, and more importantly, Hess forced the Supreme Court to respond
to the underlying problem which gave rise to the case: the difficulties with
the Lake Country Estates arm-of-the-state doctrine. Since the test was
implemented, the lower courts had difficulty applying it uniformly. 13
Instead of merely applying the test, the lower courts were adding to it in a
way to reach a result they found acceptable.'33 For instance, the Third
Circuit refused to give full deferenceto the Lake Country Estates test-instead
it increased the test by also applying its own version in Blake v. Kline.3
In Feeney, the Second Circuit emphasized the risk to the state treasury factor
although the original test did not emphasize any one factor over the
others. 1
35
A number of articles have recognized that the Lake Country Estates test
was no longer functional and advocated revision.'36 The note by Alex
Rogers was most effective in pointing out the failures in the test.'37 Rogers
focused on the disparities created by the circuits and how a fact-intensive test,
such as the arm-of-the-state doctrine, was ineffective in resolving the
128. Port Authority PBA, 819 F.2d at 418 (granting immunity to the Port
Authority); Feeney, 873 F.2d at 633 (denying PATH immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment).
129. Hess, 8 F.3d at 811.
130. Unlike Feeney, waiver could not be argued in Hess since both petitioners
missed the statutory deadline for suit in federal court. Since waiver was not an
available back door, the Court was forced to respond to the entitlement issue.
131. Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 408. The dissent, on the other hand, supported the Third
Circuit's analysis focusing on state control objectives, and would have granted PATH
immunity. Id. at 411-12 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
132. See generally Alex E. Rogers, Note, Clothing State Governmental Entities
with Sovereign Immunity: Disarray in the Eleventh Amendment Arm-of-the-State
Doctrine, 92 COLTJM. L. REv. 1243 (1992), for a detailed exposition of the lower
court's application and alteration of this test. See also supra notes 32-78 and
accompanying text.
133. Rogers, supra note 10, at 1263-65. This dysfunctional application is the
heart of Rogers' argument for adopting a new test. Id.
134. Port Authority PBA, 819 F.2d at 417-18.
135. Feeney, 873 F.2d at 631.
136. See Rogers, supra note 10, at 1282-83; Needle, supra, note 39, at 225.
137. Rogers, supra note 10, at 1282-83.
[Vol. 60
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important issues.13 Justice Ginsburg found Rogers' article convincing
enough to recognize it in her opinion.139
Although the need for clarification and restatement of the analysis of
Eleventh Amendment immunity was apparent, the majority and the dissent
strongly disagreed as to what revisions should be made. The dissent sought
to retain most of the former analysis while clarifying the rough edges and
making state control the most important factor.14° Justice O'Connor's
dissent resonates with concern for abiding by precedent.141
The majority attempted to ground its new formulation in the precedent
of Lake Country Estates by analyzing all of its factors in relation to the
situation in Hess and purported to retain those factors.'42 But in examining
the precedent, the majority altered its meaning. Indeed, the majority states
that Lake Country Estates set up the presumption against immunity.'43 Lake
Country Estates actually limited the presumption of non-immunity to
situations where the entity was comparable to a political subdivision, and the
majority stretched that presumption to cover all bi-state entities, even those
which do not look like municipalities.'
138. Rogers, supra note 10, at 1264-65. Rogers attributes the lower court's
confusion in Eleventh Amendment cases to the Supreme Court's lack of direction. Id.
Rogers cited the following cases as examples of the variety of factors employed by the
lower courts: Benning v. Board of Regents of Regency Universities, 928 F.2d 775,
777 (7th Cir. 1991) (considering four factors); Puerto Rico Ports Authority v. MV
Manhatten Prince, 897 F.2d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1990) (considering seven factors); Urbano
v. Board of Managers of N.J. State Prison, 415 F.2d 247, 250-51 (3d Cir. 1969)
(considering nine factors); Tuveson v. Florida Governor's Counsel on Indian Affairs,
Inc., 734 F.2d 730, 732 (11th Cir. 1984) (court characterizing is most important
factor). Id. at 1269-70.
139. Her recognition was used as extra support for the argument that state-
controls analysis is unreliable and unmanageable, and therefore, should not be the
controlling factor, as the dissent argued. Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 404. Notably, the
majority adopted the first part of Rogers' approach, which advocated non-immunity
unless the state clearly expressed an intent to make it a state agency. The majority
rejected the second part of his test which focused on the ability of the entity to
generate its own revenue. Id. at 406.
140. Id. at 411-12 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissentalsorecognizes Rogers'
article as making clear the disparity between courts, and agrees that perhaps one factor
ought to be controlling, but argued for "state control" factor rather than state treasury.
Id. at 410 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
141. Id. The dissent argues that making the state treasury factor the controlling
factor contradicts the text of the Amendment itself, which allows for suits in law or
equity. Id.
142. Id. at 402-03.
143. Id. at 402.
144. Lake Country Estates, 440 U.S. at 401.
1995]
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Although the majority proposes to take only a half step away from the
former "factor based analysis" of Eleventh Amendment immunity, Hess
discarded the old analysis. The test now consists of (1) a presumption that bi-
state entities do not qualify for Eleventh Amendment immunity, (2) unless the
states' treasuries are exposed to liability for a federal judgment against the
entity.145 The majority purports to retain the analysis of whether the states
confer immunity in structuring the entity."' As noted by the dissent,
however, making fiscal responsibility the overarching factor will make it
determinative.'47 The two-prong test will, in effect, eliminate the need to
review any other factors.
Finally, the third important component of Hess is the timing of the
decision. If one only considers the Hess decision, it would be difficult to
reconcile the strong dissent in Hess with the unanimous holding of non-
immunity in Feeney, especially in light of the fact that Justice O'Connor
authored both opinions. The lower-court struggle with the application of the
immunity test was apparent by 1990, so the majority in Feeneymust have had
a reason for postponing resolution of that issue.
The Supreme Court had a prime opportunity to resolve the disparity in
Feeney, but they chose to decide the case on other grounds.14 A review of
Feeney reveals an attempt to formulate a narrow holding based solely on the
issue of waiver." 9 Instead of taking up the issue of whether bi-state entities
were entitled to immunity, Justice O'Connor made assumptions in order to get
to the issue of waiver. 5 Justice O'Connor was joined in her majority
opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, Scalia and
Kennedy.' In Hess, Justice O'Connor was joined in the dissent by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia and Thomas." 2 Justice Kennedy was
the only justice to change sides when the immunity question reappeared in
Hess.'53 From Kennedy's position with the majority in Hess, we can infer
that had the Court taken up the immunity question in 1990, he may have been
the fifth vote for denial of immunity. Therefore, the majority in Feeney chose
145. Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 406.
146. Id. at 404.
147. Id. at 410 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
148. Feeney, 495 U.S. at 308-09.
149. Id. at 306.
150. Id. at 305 (Justice O'Connor inserted the assumption made in Petty that bi-
state entities are entitled to immunity because they are a joint agency of two states).
151. Id. at 300.
152. Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 408 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 397. Three of the five justices, including the opinion's author, making
up the majority in Hess, did not participate in the Feeney decision. They are Justices
Ginsburg, Souter and Breyer.
[Vol. 60
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to review only the waiver issue because they risked losing a majority if they
had forced the immunity issue.
If Kennedy had sided with the concurrence,"' the result would have
been more drastic because the four concurring Justices were intent upon
overruling Hans v. Louisiana and redefining the Eleventh Amendment to be
solely a jurisdictional provision. By 1994, when the Hess case reached the
Supreme Court, only one of the four concurring Justices in Feeney remained
on the bench.'55 Thus, although the great debate continues in regard to the
meaning of the Eleventh Amendment, the support for eliminating any
expansive meaning for the Eleventh Amendment has dwindled down to one
justice. Although Hess constitutes a loss for the supporters of completeimmunity, it looks like the possibility of overturning the 100 year-old
precedent established by Hans v. Louisiana has passed for now.
VI. CONCLUSION
From a cursory review of the Hess decision, it would appear merely to
take up a rung on the ladder of Supreme Court decisions interpreting the
protection of the Eleventh Amendment. In reality, this decision makes some
startling changes. Hess arises from the evergrowing sentiment for diluting the
once ominous reach of Eleventh Amendment immunity. It represents an
interim step: not going as far as relegating immunity to jurisdictional status,
as argued by Justice Stevens, but also not maintaining the presumption ofimmunity for bi-state entities. Hess may not make much difference in the
number of cases granting or denying immunity, since most courts had
generally concluded that bi-state entities did not qualify for immunity, but it
does clear up the immunity test allowing for a quick resolution in place of the
cumbersome test delineated in Lake Country Estates.
JENNIFER A. WINKING
154. The concurrence in Feeney was limited solely to the holding denying
immunity. Feeney, 495 U.S. at 309-18 (Brennan, J., concurring).
155. Justice Stevens argued in his concurrence in Hess for the overturning of
Hans v. Louisiana. Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 407 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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